1.
COMPARISONS ARE ODOROUS' -PRISONERS AND THE RIGHT TO
PENSION INSURANCE
The Stummer case is concerned with whether prisoners who are obliged to work as part of their prison regime should be insured for old-age pensions. 3 Mr. Stummer spent about twenty-eight years of his life in prison and worked for lengthy periods in the prison kitchen or the prison bakery. However, under Austrian law, he was not affiliated to the old-age pension system. 4 Courts in Europe appear to have generally rejected the notion that excluding prisoners in such circumstances from insurance involves any breach of national or international legal norms.
The European Commission and the Court of Human Rights have previously rejected such  School of Law and Social Science, Glasgow Caledonian University; e-mail: mcousi11@caledonian.ac.uk 1 In Iwaszkiewicz v Poland, 30614/06, 26 July 2011, the Court of Human Rights (with much unnecessary hesitation) again held that the termination of a disability pension to which the applicant was never entitled in the first place is not a breach of P1-1. 2 For developments in the period, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/122881.pdf 3 Stummer v Austria, 37452/02, 7 July 2011. 4 Section 4 of the General Social Security Act provides that employees are compulsorily affiliated to the old-age pension scheme and defines an employee as any person working in consideration of remuneration in a relationship of personal and economic dependency. There is also a low earnings threshold below which persons are not compulsorily insured (and it appears from the judgment that Mr. Stummer's earnings would have been below this threshold). The Court noted that, since 1994, prisoners have been insured for unemployment insurance.
claims as manifestly unfounded. 5 The Austrian supreme court has also taken the view that work performed on the basis of a statutory, rather than a voluntarily accepted, duty to work did not fall within the scope of the compulsory insurance scheme and this did not breach equal treatment principles. 6 The US courts have also rejected such arguments. 7 However, instead of being dismissed as manifestly unfounded, Mr. Stummer's case was referred to the grand chamber.
The Court considered the claim from two aspects. First, Mr. Stummer complained that the exemption of those engaged in prison work from affiliation to the old-age pension system was discriminatory and in breach of Article 14, taken in conjunction with P1-1. Clearly the pension was a possession within the meaning of P1-1 8 and the Court had previously ruled that being a prisoner was a status. 9 The first issue to be considered was, therefore, whether Mr.
Stummer was in a comparable position to an insured person. While accepting that 'prison work differs from the work performed by ordinary employees in many aspects [and] serves the primary aim of rehabilitation and resocialisation' the Court took the view that this was not decisive. 10 Rather the issue was 'not so much the nature and aim of prison work itself but the need to provide for old age'. The Court found that in this regard the applicant as a working prisoner was in a relevantly similar situation to ordinary employees. 11
The Court therefore turned to examine whether the difference in treatment was justified. It accepted that the aims relied on by Austria, i.e. preserving the economic efficiency and overall consistency of the old-age pension system by excluding from benefits persons who have not made meaningful contributions, were legitimate. In its consideration of 5 Harbold v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir., 1972 where the court rejected a similar challenge on the basis that the exclusion of prison work is rationally related to the purpose of the Social Security Act, which is to replace loss of support in the national economy for workers, their dependents and their survivors. 8 The Court (at para. 88) reiterated its 'but for' approach whereby 'the relevant test is whether, but for the condition of entitlement about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive the benefit in question'. We noted in the last issue of this journal the failure of the Court to adopt this approach in Puricel v Romania, 20511/04, 14 June 2011. proportionality, the Court noted that although there is no European consensus on the matter, there is an evolving trend towards inclusion of prisoners in social security, reflected in the 2006 European Prison Rules, which recommend in Rule 26.17 that 'as far as possible prisoners who work shall be included in national social security systems'. Furthermore, the Court noted that at the material time (i.e. between the 1960s and 90s) there was no common ground regarding the affiliation of working prisoners to national social security systems. The
Court concluded that 'On the basis of the facts of the present case and all the information before it, ...
the system of prison work and the social cover associated with it taken as whole is not "manifestly without reasonable foundation". In a context of changing standards, a Contracting State cannot be reproached for having given priority to the insurance scheme, namely unemployment insurance, which it considered to be the most relevant for the reintegration of prisoners upon their release.' 12 Therefore, 'while the respondent State is required to keep the issue raised by the present case under review', the Court concluded that Austria had not exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to it.
However, this aspect of the case was a majority ruling by the rather narrow vote of 10 to seven. The dissenting judges argued that 'the non-affiliation of working prisoners to the old-age pension system creates a distinction between prisoners and ordinary employees, which risks producingand in the applicant's case actually producesa long-term effect going well beyond the legitimate requirements of serving a particular prison term '. 13 Mr. Stummer also argued that since he was not affiliated to the old-age pension system, work performed as a prisoner could not be regarded as falling under the terms of Article 4(3) (a) of the Convention and therefore violated Article 4(2).
Article 4 provides that
1.
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2.
No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 12 Paras. 109-110. 13 Dissent, para. 11.
3.
For the purpose of this article the term 'forced or compulsory labour' shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of [the] Convention or during conditional release from such detention'.
The Court (ungrammatically) noted that Article 4(3) 'is not intended to "limit" the exercise of the right guaranteed by paragraph 2, but to "delimit" the very content of that right, for it forms a whole with paragraph 2 and indicates what the term "forced or compulsory labour" is not to include.' 14
Despite the rather obvious answer, the Court went on to a lengthy consideration of the concept of 'forced or compulsory labour' and the exception thereto. In particular, Mr.
Stummer argued that prison work without affiliation to the old-age pension system was not covered by Article 4(3 
2.
'PEOPLE ARE USUALLY THE HAPPIEST AT HOME' − RESIDENCE,
PRESENCE AND THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY
The Stewart case concernsyet againissues of residence and the right to social security. 20
It involved a rather unusual social security benefit: the UK incapacity benefit in youth (IBY).
Incapacity benefit is a straightforward social security contribution-based benefit payable in the event of short-term incapacity. IBYwhich is not, in fact, a separate benefitinvolves a derogation from the contribution rules in the case of persons born with or acquiring a serious disability in youth and is based on the assumption that such persons are unlikely to be able to work in insurable employment so as to qualify for 'ordinary' incapacity benefit. The IBY therefore replaced the general contribution requirements with a residence/presence requirement. The measure may thus be seen as a policy measure to ensure equality for persons with severe disability, in the sense of treating unalike persons differently. 21
In order to satisfy this the claimant must be 'ordinarily resident' in Great Britain, present in Great Britain on the date of claim, and present in Great Britain for not less than 26 weeks in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the relevant day. Ms. Stewart was born in 1989, had Down's Syndrome and had never worked. 22 In 2000, she moved with her parents to Spain. In 2005 she claimed IBY but this was refused on the grounds that she did not satisfy the presence requirement.
Advocate General Cruz Villalón accepted that, on the basis of the Court's normal approach, the use of residence clauses was not possible in relation to social security benefits under Regulation 1408/71 (now 883/2004), and it was not disputed that IBY was a social security benefit. 23 However, he argued that the case law concerned situations where residence requirements operated 'essentially as "additional" or complementary conditions to the conditions for entitlement to social benefits'. 24 In this case, in contrast, the residence requirement operated as a 'criterion of connection' to the social security system of the UK.
The Advocate General pointed out that, were such a connection not allowed (in the absence of contribution requirements), any national of a Member State in the same situation as Ms.
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Case C-503/09, Stewart [2011] ECR I-000. 21 Any consideration of issues concerning equality or disability is, however, noticeably lacking from the Court's judgment (and indeed at all judicial levels).
22
She fell within the scope of the Regulation only as a family member. 23 Opinion, paras. 36-48. The referring court did ask whether it should be classified as an invalidity or sickness benefit. The Court held that it was an invalidity benefit (judgment at paras. 29-54). 24 Ibid., para. 51.
Stewart would be able to obtain IBY without ever having been affiliated to the UK social security system. 25 He asked whether EU law is to be interpreted in such a way that it can constrain a Member State to choose between the withdrawal of a social benefit so conceived, the conditions of entitlement to which go beyond what is reasonable, and altering that social benefit in such a way that it may be treated, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, as a special noncontributory benefit. 26
He considered that Regulation 1408/71 did not absolutely prohibit residence from forming such a criterion of connection as evidenced by article 18 of that Regulation, which refers to national legislatures making 'the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefit conditional upon the completion of periods of insurance, employment or residence'. More The Advocate General took the view that the residence condition in this case could be justified 'only on the dual condition that it serves to provide a connection and that it only comes into play in the absence of any other connection'. 27 The Advocate General speculated as to whether Ms Stewart could rely on her status as a member of the family of a person entitled to a pension within the scope of Article 28 of Regulation 1408/71 in order to provide such 'other connection' but did not provide any clear answer to this question. 28 In addition, he argued that a residence condition could not be used to exclude a person who is already entitled to benefit. 29
In summary, he concluded that the EU law did not prohibit making the award of a social benefit subject to a condition of residence provided that such condition (replacing a contribution condition) served only to provide a connection between the claimant and the UK social security scheme and, secondly, was unenforceable against persons having a comparable connection. It was for the Upper Tribunal to determine whether Ms Stewart's situation and in particular her status as a member of the family of a pensioner could support the conclusion that there is a connection sufficient to preclude that condition of residence from being enforceable against her. It seems unlikely that article 28 would have given rise to a right to benefit 30 and the real issue to be considered would have been whether the fact a person is a member of the family of people affiliated to the social security system of the Member State in question and is dependent upon them formed a sufficient connection. 31
The Court came to a rather similar conclusion as the Advocate General but by an entirely different route. Ignoring the Advocate General's argument that an alternative approach be taken to residence conditions which constituted a 'connection' to the social security system, However, unlike the Advocate General, the Court ruled that the past presence requirement was 'not necessarily a "residence clause" within the meaning of … Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1408/71'. 34 It is perhaps worth quoting in extenso the Advocate General's view on this issue. He said 'I must, however, insist that the two conditions relating to presence make sense, within the system as a whole, only in relation to the condition of residence.
Indeed, I find it impossible to imagine that the national legislature could have envisaged the award of short-term incapacity benefit in youth solely on the basis of the past and/or actual presence of the claimant, that is to say, in a case where the claimant, whilst not being ordinarily resident in the territory of the Member State, satisfies the other two conditions. That amounts to saying that, whilst it may be argued that the condition of past presence is compatible with EU law, by excluding consistently that the condition of ordinary residence is, in any event, not compatible with it, it is clear that the condition of past presence has, within the general scheme of short-term incapacity benefit in youth, no chance of existing independently.' 35 The Court accepted that the past presence condition constituted a restriction on free movement which required to be justified. 36 The outcome of this case does not seem unreasonable. It appears likely that Ms. Stewart will be awarded the benefit on the basis of her link with the UK. Although the Court indicated that the various elements (cited in paras. 97-101) constituted such a link, this did not form the operative part of the judgment and it did not specify which criteria specifically constituted a link. What happens in the future if, for example, some of the criteria no longer apply? It seems likely that the Upper Tribunal will have to consider the judgment and make more specific findings as to the basis for Ms. Stewart's entitlement.
However, the basis for the Court's approach is questionable. One might have some sympathy for the Court faced with the language of article 10 and its previous case law in being asked to rule that the residence clause was not excluded where residence constituted the sole connection with the social security system. However, if the Court did not wish to adopt the purposive approach adopted by the Advocate General, it could have held that export was 39 Again this rather ignores the fcat that the UK was the competent state.
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Paras. 97-102. 41 Operative part, my emphasis.
subject to the person concerned being linked to the national system. As noted above, Ms.
Stewart indeed satisfied that requirement given that the UK was the competent state.
However, the Court's ruling that 'past presence' is not (necessarily) 42 a residence condition is neither logical not consistent with its own case law. One might point out (in addition to the Advocate General's comments quoted above) that in Swaddling the Court specifically ruled that 'the length of residence in the Member State in which payment of the benefit at issue is sought cannot be regarded as an intrinsic element of the concept of residence within the meaning of Article 10a of Regulation 1408/71 '. 43 As to the alternative grounds constituting a genuine link, the Court highlighted three main factors: (i) links to the UK social security system; (ii) family relationships; and (iii) Ms.
Stewart's having 'passed a significant part of her life' in the UK. As to the latter, it seems unwise in principle to say that a residence rule cannot be applied but that an alternative link might be having 'passed a significant part of one's life' in a country. The most convincing links appearat first sightto be Ms. Stewarts's existing links to the UK social security scheme through payment of DLA and the fact that she was being awarded credited contributions (and, indeed, this should be a sufficient basis to award benefit in the instant case). However, when one looks further at the principles involved, both links are a rather fortuitous outcome of the factual circumstances and the details of UK law. DLA is paid under a transitional provision of Regulation 1408/71 (apparently as her receipt of the payment predated the introduction of Regulation 1247/92). The granting of credited contributions arises from the detail of UK law which could easily be amended. So a person in a similar situation to Ms. Stewart might well not satisfy this particular link to the national system. Third, it would perhaps be preferablegiven the emphasis on autonomy and independence in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesnot to erect further derived rights of the basis of dependency. Nonetheless, this would appear to be the most enduring link which a person in the position of Ms Stewart has with the UK system. 42 The Court (at 73) explicitly accepted that such a rule 'could be equivalent, in practice, to a habitual residence clause, if, in particular, such condition requires long periods of presence in the Member State concerned ... .'
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Case C-90/97, Swaddling, [1999] ECR I-1075. In that case, the UK authorities had required a period of at least eight weeks to elapse before a person could be considered to be habitually resident, but this was rejected by the Court.
